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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of restricting bilateral trade imbalances in a very simple three
country, three good model. The pattern of bilateral trade balances matters because in the Nash
equilibrium, each country will impose tariffs on countries with whom they have bilateral deficits
or promote trade with countries with whom they have bilateral surpluses. Nevertheless, all
countries lose from a Nash country-bashing war. It is shown that while each country loses from
the unilateral elimination of its bilateral imbalances, a country can gain from a bilateral
agreement with its deficit partner provided that country has a surplus with a country devoted to
free trade. The incentive of individual countries to bash other countries in a multilateral world
gives an argument for a world trade agreement.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and should not be attributed
to the Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas or to the Federal Reserve System.Country-Bashing Tariffs: Do Bilateral Trade Deficits Matter?
W. Michael Cox and Roy J. Ruffin'
Over the past decade, America's exports to Japan have averaged only three-fourths of
imports from that nation. America's long-time bilateral trade deficit with Japan has led to
repeated Japan-bashing -actual or threatened tariffs or quotas on Japanese goods (Bayard and
Elliot, 1994). In the Spring of 1995, for example, the U. S. threatened 100 percent duties on
Japanese luxury cars on the grounds that Japan's automobile market is closed to American
products.'
It is well known to international trade theorists that the maximum gains from trade come
from multilateral, not bilateral exchange. The folk wisdom among trade theorists is that
bilateral trade deficits with specific countries do not matter because they are generally offset by
bilateral surpluses with other nations. As put by Corden (1993, p. 74), for example, focusing on
bilateral balances is "grosslymisguided." Perhaps as a consequence of this understanding, trade
1 Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas and Southern Methodist University; University ofHouston and Research
Associate, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. We wish to thank David Gould for his insightful comments and
Levent Akdeniz for his assistance. The views expressed here are the anthors and are not necessarily those of
the Federal Reserve System.
'The evidence that the U.S. bilateral deficit with Japan is due to Japanese policies is mostly anecdotal. For
example, stories abound that Japan's complex distribution system, exclusionary business practices, and lax
antitrust enforcement are responsible for the deficit. Regression analysis tells a different story. Saxonhouse
(1983,1986) preseuts cross-country regressions in which Japan is shown to be no more protectionist than other
advanced countries. Zwiebel (1993) applies the Saxonhouse methodology to a smaller set of countries (the
Group of Seven) and finds that Japan imports more than the predicted amounts for most manufacturing
industries while the United States imports less. Although Lawrence (1987) reached different conclusions, it is
reasonable to conclnde, along with Bhagwati (1989), that Japan is not "asymmetrically denying access to its
markets in manufactures" (Bhagwati, 1989,p. 70).
1theorists have paid little attention to the study ofbilateral imbalances.' Indeed, we are not
aware of a single paper that explores the welfare consequences of controlling bilateral trade
imbalances.
4
This paper extends the theory of optimal tariffs to consider country-bashing tariffs, that
IS, tariffs or subsidies on the goods from particular countries. We explore bilateral trade issues
by developing a very simple, three country, three good model that higWights the welfare aspects
of bilateral trade. In our model, a country can lower its bilateral trade deficit with one of its
trading partners by either taxing that country's goods or by subsidizing imports from the other
country. Uniform import or export tariffs have no impact. Thus, the only tariffs that have any
impact in our model are differential tariffs or subsidies. Specific country-bashing tariffs hurt one
trading partner and help the other. For example, when the U.S. imposes tariffs on Japanese
luxury cars, the effect is equivalent to a subsidy on German or Swedish luxury cars.
To focus squarely on the issue ofbilateral trade imbalances, we abstract from the usual
optimal tariff argument. The standard theory of optimal tariffs applies to the imposition of
tariffs by one country on goods from the rest ofthe world. From this literature, economists
know that a large country can gain by cutting its exports to the rest of the world, even ifother
countries retaliate (Johnson, 1953). But just as it was useful for trade theorists to abstract from
comparative advantage to study intra-industry trade (Krugman, 1979), so it may prove useful to
abstract from the common optimum tariff argument in order to more clearly understand the
economics ofbilateral trade.
, The emphasis has been on explaining bilateral trade flows by using tbe gravity equation. See Anderson
(1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bergstrom (1987), and Thursby and Thursby (1987).
4 It should be noted that tbe public finance literature examines tbe issue of tbe harmonization ofdomestic
taxes witbin acustoms union when member countries may have abilateral imbalance witbnon-member countries.
See Berglas (1981) and Georgakopoulos (1992) for an analysis of tbe Pareto-inefficiencies of such unions.
2We show that eliminating bilateral trade deficits unilaterally is always harmful. An
incipient, unanswered, country-bashing tariff on the deficit partner (or subsidy on the surplus
partner), however, is always beneficial.' But ifall countries play this game, all lose. Thus, it is
no more irrational for countries to focus on the pattern ofbilateral trade deficits and surpluses
than for prisoners to confess in the prisoners' dilemma game. Indeed, we find that for our
model the Nash equilibrium for country-bashing tariffs involves the partial elimination of a
bilateral imbalances. This may in part explain why countries are so concerned with bilateral
imbalances. The result is also reflective of the concerns of trade theorists: if all countries lose
from a Nash country-bashing war, focusing on bilateral deficits turns out to be a self-defeating
policy.
In our model, if in free trade there are no bilateral imbalances, then the Nash
equilibrium is also free trade. If one country nevertheless imposes a tariff, the country on whom
the tariff has been imposed will now have a bilateral deficit with that country and will have an
incentive to retaliate.
In general, when we move away from Nash games, we find that ifone country insists on
free trade, the partner with whom it has a bilateral deficit can actually gain from forcing the
remaining country into a bilateral agreement that eliminates or reduces their bilateral trade
deficit. This is accomplished by threatening even more damaging unilateral action.
Section I illustrates the setup with a simple example and diagram that can be used to
show how bilateral trade works. Section II formally presents the formal model, derives the
equilibrium for any vector of tariffs, and shows that a common country-bashing tariff harms all
countries. Section III computes the Nash equilibrium and shows how the pattern of bilateral
5 This is much stronger than the usual result that a subsidy may be optimal when several terms of trade are
involved. See Corden (1976) and Jones (1967).
3balances determines the costs and benefits of country-bashing. Section IV examines the welfare
consequences of eliminating bilateral trade deficits and presents a simple measurement of the
bilateral trade deficit. Section V presents an argument for a world trade agreement that is truly
multilateral (three or more countries). Section VI states the conclusions.
I. Introduction and Preview
Bilateral trade imbalances arise because in a multilateral world reciprocal demands
between any pair of countries need not be the same. Endowment or preference asymmetries
give rise to divergent incipient relative prices across trading partners, and thus to welfare gains
from bilateral trade imbalances with those partners.
Suppose there are three countries: A, B, and C. Country A is endowed with apples, B is
endowed with bananas, and C is endowed with cherries. Each country likes and consumes only
the goods from the other two countries. Assume country A spends more on bananas than
cherries; B spends more on cherries than apples; and C spends more on apples than bananas.
With free trade, this means that country A must have a bilateral trade deficit with country B,
while it has a bilateral trade surplus with country C. The other countries are in a similar
situation.
Assume, for example, that each country always spends 75 percent of its income on its
favored good and the other 25 percent on the other good. Then each country's welfare or real
income can be measured by the utility function: U = X"Y", where X is the favored good and
Y is the other good. Now, suppose further that each country is endowed with 100 pounds of its
fruit. The free trade consumption and utility pattern of each country is thus easy to describe.
Because of the symmetry ofthe assumptions, in a free trade equilibrium all prices will be exactly
the same. Thus, we may let the free trade price of each fruit be $1 a pound. Each country's
income will be exactly $100; and each will spend $75 on its favored good. Figure 1 shows the
4free trade solution for, say, country A. It consumes at point F and its utility level is U = 56.99.
In the free trade equilibrium country A exports $25 worth of apples to country B and $75
to country C. In turn, country A imports $75 worth of bananas from country B and $25 worth
of cherries from country C. Thus, as with the other countries, country A has a $50 deficit with
country B and a $50 trade surplus with country C. The total trade account is balanced.
Suppose now all of the countries become concerned with their trade imbalances. If a
multilateral policy were followed in which each country imposed the same country-bashing tariff
on its favored import until bilateral imbalance were eliminated, then every country would
consume 50 pounds of each imported fruit. This must be the case because with the same tariffs,
the world prices of each fruit must be identical (say, again, $1). For every country now to
consume 50 pounds of each imported fruit, it is necessary that each country impose a tariff rate
of 200 percent in order to spend three times as much on its favored good. For example, in
country A the domestic price of bananas would have to be $3 instead of $1. The utility level of
each country would now be U = 50, as shown in Figure 1.
It is clear that ifcountry A proceeded unilaterally to eliminate its bilateral trade deficit,
it would have to impose a much larger country-bashing tariff on B. Country A's consumption of
bananas, its favored good, would have to drop below 50 pounds. We shall see below that if
country A goes alone, it will move all the way to point L, where its consumption pattern is
completely reversed from the free trade level! Point N will be shown to be the Nash
equilibrium.
II. The basic model
In this section we set out the model, derive the general tariff-distorted equilibrium, and
discuss the benchmark case in which all countries follow identical policies.
There are three countries and three goods, as in our numerical example. For notational
5convenience we call the countries and goods 1, 2, and 3. We let good 3 be the numeraire.
Country i has a fixed endowment of good i and consumes the other two goods. Preferences are
described by identically symmetrical Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Country 1 favors good 2, 2
favors 3, and 3 favors 1. We designate (usually) good j as i's favored good. Country i consumes
goods j and k, and its utility function is:
(1) u. = (C..)b/(l+bl(C. \lI(l+b)
1 IJ IkJ·
Thus, each country spends b times as much on its favored good (good j) as on the other good,
so that b > 1. If b = 1, there would be no bilateral deficits under free trade.
Each country faces the budget constraint
where cij is the consumption of good j by country i, X; is country i's fixed endowment of good i,
and Pi is the world price of good i. Note that any tax/subsidy structure by country i on both
import goods can be replicated as an equivalent tariff on the favored good, called ti, which is
defined ti = ~/t"" where ~m is unity plus the ad valorem tariff country i imposes on good m.
Clearly, ~ > 1 is consistent with ~j > 1 (a tax on i'sfavored good) or t", < I (a subsidy on i's
other import). Thus, the domestic relative price of i's favored good in terms of its other import
is P}/Pk' Since consumers adjust their marginal rates of substitution to domestic prices, the
consumption pattern of each country must satisfy:
Clearly, uniform import taxes (or an export tax) wash out in this model.
Assuming that tariff revenues or subsidies are redistributed as lump-sum transfers to or
from consumers, equations (2) and (3) imply that the solutions for country i'sconsumption
pattern are:
6(5) C lk = PIX;t/Pk(b+~).
The market clearing equations can be written:
(6) c12 + C,2 = x2
(7) cl, + c" = x,.
Equations (4) and (5) can be substituted into equations (6)-(7) to solve for PI and P2
(noting p, = I):
(8) PI = (x,/x,)[(t,+b)/(t,+b)](B2,1B I2)




It is clear from (8) and (9) that when all tariff rates are the same the prices of goods 1 and 2 in
terms of good 3 simply reflect their relative supplies. That is, PI = x,/X; when tl = t, for all i
because all the terms involving b cancel. Of course, this solution is intuitively obvious because
when country demands are symmetric and tariffs are equal, only relative supplies matter. Since
world prices are not affected in this case, it must follow that each country is made worse off by
matching country-bashing tariffs (just as for the small country in standard trade theory).
In the general case where tariff rates are unequal, the consumption pattern for country i
is [Using (4), (5), (8), and (9)]:
(11) cij = bxjBj/(tj+b)Bki; C'k = ~xkBj/(tk+b)Blj'
If all countries impose the same country-bashing tariff (t), the Bi;'s cancel and the consumption
pattern is:
(12) cij = bx/(t+b); and cik= tx,l(t+b).
It clearly follows that the utility level is:
(13) 11; = [tbbx;'Xk]lI(l+b)/(bH).
7Summarizing from equation (12):
Proposition 1: When all countries impose the same country-basWng tariff each country
consumes bl(t+b) ofthe world supply ofits favored good and tl(t+b) ofthe other import.
It is easy to show from equation (13) that du/dt < O. As we remarked earlier, this
result is not surprising. Everyone loses from a country-bashing war in which countries impose
the same tariff on their favored good. This result stands in sharp contrast to that from the
conventional theory of optimum tariffs in which, as is well known, large countries can gain from
a matching tariff war. Indeed, we have completely abstracted from the usual optimum tariff
argument, which relies on the ability of a country to control its exports. In our model, exports
are fixed.
A trivial corollary to Proposition 1 is useful:
Corollary 1: Under free trade, each country consumes the share bl(1+b) ofthe world supply of
its favored good and the share 11(1+b) ofthe world supply ofthe other import.
III. The Nash Equilibrium
We now examine the Nash equilibrium in which each country sets its tariff rate so as to
maximize domestic welfare on the assumption that the other countries will not retaliate.
6 There
is an incentive for each country to impose a country-bashing tariff. The reason is simple:
countries spend more on their favored good. An incipient tariff on the favored good, therefore,
improves the country's terms of trade on its most important good and worsens its terms of trade
on the relatively unimportant good. Welfare thus improves. As the country-bashing tariff is
increased on the favored good, the volume of trade falls for that good and rises for the other
good. Eventnally, the welfare gain from reducing bilateral deficits ceases.
6 The study oftariff games as Nash equilibria in tbe general two-country, two-good trade model has a long
history, beginning witbJohnson (1953). See McMillan (1986) and Riezman (1982). For extensions to conjectural
variations and quotas, see Thursby and Jensen (1983) and Tower (1975).
8Solving for the Nash equilibrium is straightforward. Using (I) and (11), the utility for
country i is simply,
(14) u; = a[1IB"lbl(l+b)[t/Bijlll(l+bl,
where a is a constant reflecting the endowments and the Bijs are defined as in (10). Equating
aui ati to zero implies
(15) Bi}itk = bBki.
Thus, due to symmetry in the Nash equilibrium, all 1;'s are the same (t).' That is,
(16) t = b
1l2
•
Substituting (15) into (12) shows the consumption pattern in the Nash equilibrium. From (16)
and Proposition I, we get :




) ofthe world supply ofits favored good and the share 11(1+b'J2) ofthe world
supply ofthe other import good.
Note that if b exceeds I, then t exceeds 1. The implication is that, starting from free
trade, each country generally (b > 1) has an incentive to either impose a tariff on goods from its
deficit partner or subsidize imports from its surplus partner. It follows that the bilateral trade
deficit in the Nash equilibrium is smaller than that under free trade. In the next section we show
that when t = b, bilateral deficits are eliminated. In the Nash case, however, t < b and bilateral
deficits remain.
It is important to note that a country's incentive to impose a tariff depends on the state
of its bilateral imbalances, whatever may be their cause. To illustrate this, consider the case
where under free trade there are no bilateral imbalances (b = I), so that the Nash equilibrium
, It is trivial to show that the symmetric solution is unique.
9is the free trade equilibrium. If one country then imposes a tariff, the country on whom the
tariff has been imposed will have a bilateral deficit with that country, and an incentive to
retaliate. From equation (15), ift,=1 and b = I, country I'soptimal tariff is determined by
t/(I+1:,) = 2. Therefore, if t ,< I (country 2 imposes a tariff on country I or gives a subsidy to
country 3), it pays country I to impose a tariff on country 2's export. In short, the incentive to
retaliate depends on trade patterns alone, and not on whether those patterns stem from innate
preferences or inane policies.
IV. Measuring and Eliminating Bilateral Deficits
The Nash equilibrium is compelling because it represents the rational expectations
solution to trade wars and is self-reinforcing. However, since politicians and pundits almost
universally condemn bilateral deficits, it is interesting to examine the consequences of their
elimination.
Bilateral trade deficits, of course, should be expressed proportionately - that is, i's deficit
with j relative to i'stotal trade with j,
(17) D'j = {Ph - PiCjY(Ph + PSj')'
Substituting (8), (9), and (11) into (17) gives
(18) Dij = [bBjk-tjBkil/[bBjk+tjBkJ
Notice that the endowments, the x;'s,do not influence in any way the measure of the bilateral
trade deficits. Notice also that D" is not generally the same as D23 or D", except in the case of
common country-bashing tariffs.
The extent of worldwide bilateral imbalances can be measured by a weighted average of
the Di/s, specifically
(19) D = D"w" + D23w23 + D31w31 ,
where wij = (Ph + PiCjY(P,xj + p,x, + p,x,).
10It is interesting to note that if a country begins to unilaterally bash another country, its
(proportionate), bilateral trade deficit with that country falls by less than the bilateral trade
deficits of the other countries, This happens because, while the absolute trade deficits of all
countries must be the same (see footnote 8), country l's total bilateral trade with country 2 falls
by more than country 2'stotal bilateral trade with country 3, For example, if b = 3 then under
free trade Dij = 0,5, But if country 1 then imposes a tariff oft, = 2, D,z falls to 0.472 while Dz,
falls by more, to 0.423,
In the special case in which all the tariffs are equal the D'js will be the same, That is,
with ti=t in (18) all of the terms involving Bij or b+tj cancel, yielding
(20) Dij = (b-t)/(b+t),
In this case, it makes no difference whether we use DIj or the weighted average (D) referred to
above,
Proposition 3: When all countries impose the same country-bashing tarifft, the bilateral trade
deficit ofeach is (b-t)/(b+t),
It is obvious from Proposition 3 that bilateral trade deficits will disappear ifall countries
impose the common tariff ti = b, What about the nonuniform tariff case? With three countries
and overall trade balance, eliminating one bilateral trade deficit eliminates them all.' Thus, in
the general case where the tariffs are unequal, the bilateral imbalances will be eliminated when
DIZ = 0 or, from the numerator of (18),
(21) (bz + bt, + tzt,)/(b' + bt, + t,t,) = t,1b,
Two additional propositions follow from (21):
Proposition 4 (the unilateral case): For country i to unilaterally eliminate its bilateral trade
'Let Sij represent country i's surplus with country j, Since S12 + S13 = S21 + S" = S31 + S'2 = 0, it follows
that S12 = 0 implies all the S'j are zero.
11deficit when free trade prevails elsewhere, its country-bashing tariffmust be t, = b'.
Proposition 5 (the bilateral case): For countries 1 and 2 to jointly eliminate their bilateral
deficits, while country 3 is a free trader, each country-bashing tariffmust be t, = t, = b,n.
Let us now study the welfare consequences of eliminating bilateral imbalances. For
reference, recall that under free trade each country consumes the share b/(1 +b) of the world
supply of its favored good, the share 1/(1 +b) of world supply of its other import, and utility is
(22) ui = [bbx;'x,lll('+bl/(l+b).
The unilateral case. Suppose now country 1 faces free trade elsewhere in the world but
decides to unilaterally eliminate its bilateral trade deficit with country 2. Proposition 4 tells us
that in this case its tariff should be t, = b'. To find the effects of this policy we substitute tl = b'
and t, = t,= 1 into equation (11). The effects on utility and consumption patterns are dramatic.
Table 1 shows the consumption pattern for the general case as well as for our numerical
example. The consumption pattern for country 1 is literally turned upside down! In free trade,
it consumed b/(l+b) of the world supply of its favored good and 1/(1 +b) of the world supply of
its other import. Now, country 1 consumes 1/(1 +b) of the world supply of its favored good and
b/(l+b) of the world supply of its other import good. Under our numerical example, country 1
now consumes only 25 units of its favored good and 75 of its least favored good - exactly the




The ratio of free-trade utility to utility in the unilateral case is b(b-IYCI+b). Under our example (b
= 3) this ratio equals 1.73, so that real income is 73 percent higher in free trade. Unilaterally
eliminating the trade deficit is indeed "grosslymisguided."
Country 2, the object of country 1's displeasure, is even more severely damaged (see
12Table 1). Country 2 now consumes only 1/(1 +b) of the world supply of its favored good and
1/(1 + b') of the world supply of its other import. Compared to free trade, it consumes much
less of each good. In our numerical example, 2's consumption of the favored good falls from 75
to 25 and consumption of the other good falls from 25 to only 10. Thus, 2'sutility falls to 19.88
- 35 percent of its free trade utility.
Country 3 is substantially benefited by country 1 bashing country 2 because that action
increases l's demand for 3's export. In the unilateral case, country 3's consumption of its
favored good rises from b/(1 +b) to b
2/(1 +b') of the world supply; and its consumption of its
least favored good rises from 1/(1 +b) to b/(1 +b) of the world supply. In terms of our
numerical example, 3'sconsumption of its favored good rises from 75 to 90 and its consumption
of the other good rises from 25 to 75! Utility skyrockets to 85.99- a 50 percent increase over
its free trade utility.
The Bilateral Case. Is the policy of eliminating bilateral trade deficits always misguided?
The answer is: No. Consider the case where country 3 - the country with whom 1 has a surplus
- insists on free trade. This liberates country 1, because it knows that its export will always be
exempted from tariffs. Accordingly, country 1 can become very aggressive. If country 1
proceeds unilaterally, as we have just seen (b = 3), it can destroy about 65 percent of country
2's real income. Remember that country 2's bashing of country 3 is equivalent to 2's subsidizing
imports from 1. In return for country 1 reducing its tariffs on good 2 from t,= b' to t, = b312,
therefore, country 1 can easily convince country 2 to engage in bashing country 3 or subsidizing
imports from country 1. Both countries 1 and 2 would benefit from this action, as compared to
the unilateral case. As shown in Table 2, in this case, country 1 turns out to be better off than
13in free trade and country 2 is better off than it would be ifcountry 1 proceeded unilaterally.'
Surprisingly, country 3 is driven to its Nash equilibrium consumption pattern and is, thus, even
better off than if all countries imposed the tariff t = b (see below).
Country 1 is better off when both countries impose country-bashing tariffs since it is the
only country that then faces free trade for its export and since the price of its export good rises
relative to both of its import goods. Thus, in general, a country benefits from two types of
action: its restrained but unanswered bashing of the trading partner who supplies its favored
good; or that country engaging in a similar act. Each policy ultimately has the effect of
improving the home country's terms of trade.
Nothing is worse for nation than to have a bilateral trade deficit with a strict free-trading
nation, because such a country will not bash your arch-enemies. A country's arch-enemy is the
country with whom it has a bilateral trade surplus, because it will be the potential target of
country-bashing tariffs. Having a deficit with a free-trading nation puts a country in the position
of always being the potential target, and never the potential beneficiary, of other countries' wars.
The multilateral case. We already studied multilateral agreements in Propositions 1 and
3 above. In the multilateral case, ti = b eliminates bilateral imbalances, in which case each
country consumes exactly one-half of the world supply of both imports. The ratio of free trade
utility to utility under the multilateral agreement is 2bb/(l+b)/(1 +b). In Figure 1, where b = 3,
this ratio is 1.14. This multilateral case is illustrated by point M in Figure 1, where each country
imposes an ad valorem tariff rate of 200 percent (t = 3).
Summary. Using our numerical example, Table 3 gives the utility levels for all three
9 Note that the solutions shown in table 2 are not Nash equilibria. In the game involving countries I and
2 when country 3 insists on free trade (I, = I), the Nash equilibrium is asymmetric and involves country I (the
country that has a surplus with country 3) imposing a higher Nash tariff on 2 than 2's Nash tariff on 3. For
example, ifb = 3, the Nash tariffs are t, = 2.21 and t, = 1.67.
14countries, as well as the prices of goods 1 and 2 for the five distinct cases of interest: Free trade
(column 1); the Nash equilibrium (column 2); the multilateral case (column 3); the bilateral case
(column 4); and the unilateral case (column 5).
V. An Argument for a World Trade Agreement
We believe this paper gives a genuine argument for a world trade agreement, such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) - the new incarnation of GATT {General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. The usual argument for a WTO is but a mere extension of the old bilateral
one that a reciprocal reduction of tariffs helps two trading partners.
1O This argument is weak in
two ways. First, it is not really a multllateral argument (two countries suffice). And, moreover,
in a two-country model the big country can win a tariff war.
Using the insights of this paper we believe that there are three arguments for a world
trade agreement. First, a multilateral free trade agreement avoids country-bashing trade (Nash)
wars that make all parties worse off. Second, the existence of a staunchly liberal trading country
can create opportunities for aggressive bilateral policies on the part of countries that have
surpluses with that nation. Third, though not a direct implication of our specific model, even a
large country may want to join a multilateral agreement in order to minimize being the target of
country-bashing tariffs from other countries.
Unfortunately, the new WTO does not specifically prohibit country-bashing. Though
each country can take its case to the WTO, it remains to be seen how the WTO will respond to
the country-bashing efforts of its members -particularly larger ones. Our paper suggests that
there ought to be a provision in WTO that outlaws the type of behavior the United States has
been engaging in relative to Japan. The danger, however, is that such a provision could lead to
America's withdrawal from the WTO.
10 See McMillan (1986, pp. 31-32) for a discussion of GATT games.
15VII. Conclusion
The pattern of bilateral balances matters. In the Nash equilibrium, each country will
bash countries with whom they have bilateral deficits or promote trade with countries with
whom they have bilateral surpluses. Nevertheless, all countries lose from a Nash country-
bashing war. If a single country eliminates its bilateral deficit, it still loses even if the rest of the
world does not retaliate. But if a country has a trade surplus with a free trading nation, it can
gain from a bilateral agreement with its deficit partner to eliminate the bilateral deficit. On the
other hand, a country whose trade deficit is with a free-trading nation is in a disadvantageous
position because the free-trading nation will not bash its enemies and will always be the target of
country-bashing by other countries.
A great deal of work remains to be done on the empirical and theoretical aspects of
bilateral trade deficits. Many questions can be asked. For example: What (preferences, factor
endowments, etc.) is really behind nations' bilateral trade deficits? Have bilateral imbalances
increased as the world has moved to freer trade? In the Great Depression, did bilateral
imbalances grow or shrink (relative to trade)? What determines the pattern of bilateral
balances? How do bilateral imbalances influence trade policy compared to, say, political
economy issues? We look forward to the answers.
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18Table 1: Consumption When Country 1 Unilaterally Eliminates Bilateral Imbalances
General Case Example:b = 3; ~=100
Goods Goods
Countries 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0 x,l(l+b) bx,/(l+b) 0 25 75
2 x/(l+b') 0 x,l(l+b) 10 0 25
3 b'x/(l+b') bX2/(1 +b) 0 90 75 0
19Table 2: Consumption When Countries 1 and 2 Eliminate Bilateral Imbalances
General Case Example: b = 3; x,=100
Goods Goods
Countries 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0 x2bl12/(l+bl12) bx,l(l+b) 0 63.4 75
2 x/(l+bl12) 0 x3/(1+b) 36.6 0 25
3 bl12x/(l+bl12) x2/(1+bl12) 0 63.4 36.6 0
20Table 3: Policy Outcomes
b = 3; Xt= 100 (i = 1,2,3)
Eliminating Bilateral Imbalances
t.= 1 t,= b·5 t.= b tl=t,=bt.5,~=1
t,=b',tj =1
Variable Free Trade Nash Equilibrium Multilateral Bilateral Unilateral
u, 56.99 55.26 50 66.12 32.90
liz 56.99 55.26 50 27.50 19.88
U3 56.99 55.26 50 55.26 85.99
P, 1 1 1 1.183 0.833
P2 1 1 1 0.683 0.333
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